Nominations open for Daniel J. Wright Lifetime Achievement Award

Nominations are now being accepted for the Daniel J. Wright Lifetime Achievement Award, which recognizes outstanding work for Michigan’s children.

The award is a joint effort of the Michigan Supreme Court and the Department of Human Services, according to the MSC’s Office of Public Information.

The award was established in honor of the late Daniel J. Wright, an attorney and longtime leader in child support and child welfare reform.

He was credited with the “Michigan Miracle” in 2002 when, as special assistant to then-Chief Justice Maura D. Corrigan, he led the state’s efforts to upgrade Michigan’s child support enforcement system by federally mandated deadlines. By meeting the deadlines, Wright saved the state $142 million in federal fines and earned the state a $36 million refund for fines it had already paid. Later, as director of the Friend of the Court Bureau and Child Welfare Services divisions of the State Court Administrative Office, Wright helped create the state’s “Adoption Forums” to deal with adoption barriers that were stranding children in foster care. He worked on legislation to give foster children a greater voice in decisions about their lives; among other things, the law now requires courts to consult the child’s wishes when holding a hearing about placing the child in a permanent home.

According to Marcia McBrien, the MSC’s Public Information Officer, the selection committee includes Dan’s wife, Lynne Wright, who will also present the award on Adoption Day. Also on the panel: DHS Director and former Chief Justice Maura Corrigan; Steven D. Capps, director of SCAO’s Friend of the Court Bureau division; and Kelly Howard, director of SCAO’s Child Welfare Services division.

Information about nominee qualifications and how to submit a nominee for consideration is available here.

Federal judge speaks to Wayne grads; Stupak joins D.C. firm

Here’s a roundup of upcoming legal events and people of note:

• The Hon. Avern Cohn of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan will speak at Wayne State University Law School’s annual commencement ceremony.

Cohn also will receive an honorary doctor of laws degree at the ceremony, which takes place 5 p.m. May 16 at the Max M. Fisher Music Center in Detroit.

“I am deeply honored to join the past recipients of an honorary degree from the Law School, to wit: Eugene Driker, Dennis Archer, Maura D. Corrigan, Marilyn Kelly and Harold Koh,” Cohn said.

Admission to the commencement is by ticket only. For more information, contact the Law School’s Dean of Students Office at (313) 577-3997 or lawdso@wayne.edu.

• Former nine-term Congressman Bart Stupak, D-Michigan, who played a lead role in passage of the landmark health care legislation of 2010, has joined Venable LLP as a Legislative and Government Affairs partner in the firm’s Washington office.

Stupak was a senior member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and Chairman of its subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

A former police officer and Michigan state trooper, Stupak became one of the leading congressional voices on law enforcement issues: in 1994 he created the first law enforcement caucus in Congress and went on to help write and pass substantial legislation to support law enforcement professionals.

Stupak also is serving as a Fellow at Harvard University’s Institute of Politics and will be leading a study group on government investigations at the Kennedy School of Government entitled “Investigate or Irritate: Changing Corporate and Government Behavior.”

• A ribbon-cutting ceremony to open the Crime Victims Rights Exhibit at the Michigan Supreme Court Learning Center in Lansing is this coming Wednesday, April 13, at 3 p.m.

Chief Justice Robert P. Young Jr., Sen. Tonya Schuitmaker, former state legislator Senator Bill Van Regenmorter (author and proponent of Michigan’s Crime Victims Rights Act), and Attorney General Bill Schuette are scheduled to speak.

The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan is co-sponsoring the event.

The educational exhibit is a tribute to crime victims and those who advocate for them. It will feature four panels, the exhibit educates the viewer about the act, and its meaning for crime victims, through interactive educational games.

• Know a great young attorney who has made great strides in his or her career? Then the Young Lawyers Section of the State Bar of Michigan wants to know more.

The section is now accepting nominations for the 2011 Regeana Myrick Outstanding Young Lawyer Award.

All nominations must be received by May 6. The recipient of the award will be chosen by the SBM-YLS Outstanding Young Lawyer Award Subcommittee, and will notified by May 13. The award will be presented during the Fourth Annual YLS Summit on Saturday, May 21, at the Amway Grand Plaza Hotel in Grand Rapids.

In 1997, the Young Lawyers Section renamed its Outstanding Young Lawyer Award in honor of Regeana Myrick, an executive council member of the section who passed away in August of that year.

For more information, contact Brandy Y. Robinson at byrobinson@gmail.com.

Bills would streamline adoption process for foster care children

LANSING, Mich. – Michigan Supreme Court Justice Mary Beth Kelly and Michigan Department of Human Services Director Maura D. Corrigan have urged legislators to approve bills before both chambers that will streamline the adoption process for children in foster care. The passage of these bills could pave the way for expedited placement in qualified, permanent homes for more than 1,100 children.

Currently, the only person authorized to approve adoptions for children in foster care is the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) superintendent. Since April 2010, the MCI superintendent has received 1,100 such cases for approval.

Under the bills, the MCI superintendent, the legal guardian for children committed to MCI when parental rights have been terminated, may authorize a designee to provide written consent to the adoption, marriage, guardianship or emancipation of MCI wards. The designee would be allowed to authorize adoption requests where the child is already living in the recommended adoption home and a review by a caseworker and supervisor has determined there are no concerns about the placement.

Kelly said her experience as a family court judge convinced her that the bills are needed.

“No matter how good a job the MCI superintendent does, he or she is only one person, and it is simply unrealistic to expect one person to perform in-depth reviews of hundreds of these cases each year,” Kelly told legislators.

While finding a permanent, loving home for children in foster care is a key mission for DHS, Corrigan was clear that the expedited process will not sacrifice due diligence in the examination of potential adoptive families. The department will be systematic, careful and considerate when determining who will be named as a designee, Corrigan told members of the Senate Families, Seniors and Human Services committee.

“The best place for a child is in a stable, permanent home. That is our goal for each of the 4,150 children in foster care available for adoption. Joining a family should not be delayed because only one person in the entire state can authorize a child’s adoption or guardianship,” Corrigan said.

Among the bills’ supporters is the Michigan Probate Judges Association. In a March 15 letter to Sen. Judith Emmons, Judge Dorene Allen, chief judge of the Midland County Probate Court and chair of the MPJA’s Juvenile and Adoption Issues Committee, wrote that the legislation “will facilitate the permanency of children in the abuse and neglect system, certainly a goal we can all agree upon.”

Source: Michigan Department of Human Services

MSC denies rehearing of U-M v Titan, says no error using ‘insanity’ and ‘incompentency’ interchangeably

The Michigan Supreme Court has denied a motion for reconsideration in Regents of University of Michigan v Titan Insurance Co., one of the decisions released at the end of its 2009-2010 term.

The court ruled in Regents that University of Michigan Hospital, as a state entity, was not bound by the No-Fault Act’s one-year back rule under a statute that says that state claims for medical bills have no statute of limitations.

According to Titan’s attorney, Mark D. Sowle of Anselmi & Mierzejewski P.C., the decision created a problem that may not have been intended: in ruling as it did, the court overturned its own decision in Cameron v Auto Club Ins. Cameron held a minority/insanity tolling statute didn’t apply to the one-year back rule.

But the majority continuously used the terms “insanity” and “incompetency” interchangeably, which could open the door for a whole new class of plaintiffs to avoid the one-year back rule.

Sowle explained the scenario in August:

“Let’s say I was in a car accident 10 years ago and I claim I had a head injury, and therefore, I’m covered under the insanity provision,” he said. “Under this decision, I can theoretically file suit against my no-fault carrier and say, ‘Hey, you underpaid me for attendant care $1 an hour for the last 10 years.’ All of the sudden, I have a million-dollar lawsuit and I’m not bound by any statute of limitations. That’s the real danger here.”

Sowle filed a motion of reconsideration, which is still pending in the Michigan Supreme Court. His biggest concern, he said, was the Court using the term “incompetent” 15 times in place of the term “insane.”

“When you look at the dictionary definition of ‘incompetent,’ it’s a whole lot broader than the dictionary definition of ‘insane,’” he said. “On top of that, the statute defines the word ‘insane.’ It doesn’t define ‘incompetent.’”

Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly explained why she decided against reconsidering the case on the “incompetency/insanity” issue:

I write also to address our opinion’s use of the word “incompetent” rather than “insane” in discussing MCL 600.5851(1). This was not improper nor was it intended to expand the scope of MCL 600.5851(1). Indeed, I would not hesitate to vote to grant rehearing if I thought there was a need for clarification on this point. However,  there are several reasons why the opinion’s use of “incompetent” in place of “insane” is not a basis for granting rehearing. First, the legally recognized definition of “incompetent” is consistent with the statutory definition of “insane” in MCL 600.5851(2). Both terms contemplate persons who are unable to comprehend their legal rights. Second, there is nothing novel about using these terms interchangeably. The United States Supreme Court and numerous other courts, have done so for years.

Finally, it is pure speculation to predict the economic consequences of our decision. Defendant claims that it will inevitably lead to higher insurance premiums for Michigan drivers. No one is omniscient regarding when or why insurance companies choose to raise or lower premiums. However, the practical effects of our decisions generally do not dictate this Court’s reading of statutory language. This is a point with which at least one dissenting justice agrees.

One of those dissenting justices is Maura Corrigan:

In overruling Cameron v Auto Club Insurance Association, 476 Mich 55 (2006), the majority inaccurately described the class of individuals protected by the tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1). The statute protects a person who “is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues.” The majority distorted this clear language by repeatedly using the term “incompetent” interchangeably with  insane.” Whereas “insane” is statutorily defined as “a condition of mental derangement” that prevents a person from comprehending his rights, the term “incompetent” includes persons who are not properly qualified, capable, or legally fit to make a decision. MCL 600.5851(2);
Websters II New College Dictionary (2005). Thus, the term incompetent” has a potentially far broader reach than “insane,” thereby expanding the class of protected persons beyond those suffering from insanity.

The practical ramifications of the majority’s error in overruling Cameron include potentially higher premiums for all Michigan motorists who must by law purchase nofault automobile insurance. Defendant has documented that from 1978 through 2009, the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association received a total of 24,533 claims, nearly half of which involved a brain injury, the type of injury most likely to trigger the tolling provision in MCL 600.5851. By expanding that provision beyond the reach of its plain language, the majority permits a new universe of claims for accidents that occurred decades ago, claims that will ultimately be paid by the public through increased premiums.

Justice Robert P. Young, Jr. echoed Corrigan’s dissent as well as Justice Stephen J. Markman’s dissent from the original Regents decision:

And so, in this case, on an issue of the majority’s own creation—an issue not even related to the case at hand—the majority has inexplicably attempted to rewrite MCL 600.5851(1) by broadening the class of individuals covered from those who are insane to those who are merely incompetent. There is perhaps no clearer example than this case of
this majority’s demonstrated indifference to the actual words of a statute and the legislative process that considers, debates,  compromises, and ultimately selects those words. Neither the author of the majority’s opinion nor the justices who today sanction that opinion by denying rehearing deign to explain why it is appropriate for this Court to substitute a new protected category of persons for the one the Legislature actually chose. Once again in Michigan, judicial preferences trump legislative ones.

ADB’s dismissal of alcohol-related reprimand upheld

The Michigan Supreme Court has refused to review the Attorney Discipline Board’s decision to vacate a hearing panel’s reprimand, with conditions, of Dianne L. Baker, who pleaded guilty to driving while visibly impaired and faced the discipline process as a result.

As reported in our Feb. 22 issue, the Attorney Grievance Commission wanted to put Baker through the wringer. The AGC offered to back off if Baker agreed to contractual probation, which required Baker to swear off alcohol, attend counseling or submit to alcohol monitoring, and to file quarterly progress reports.

The AGC wanted all of this because it perceived that Baker had a drinking problem and was not doing anything about it. Baker declined the offer and told the AGC to prove its case.

A hearing panel agreed with the AGC’s assessment and issued a reprimand that contained substantially the same conditions Baker rejected when she turned down the contractual probation offer.

On review, the Attorney Discipline Board said the evidence just didn’t add up against Baker and vacated the reprimand. The ADB pointed to Baker’s negative alcohol tests, the hearing panel’s adverse determination of Baker’s credibility without citing any supporting evidence and Baker’s voluntary counseling sessions.

What’s more, said the ADB in its opinion:

Even if the record indicates what could be deemed excessive alcohol consumption at certain points in [Baker’s] life, we must also consider the evidence of [her] voluntary cessation or reduction of alcohol use during most periods of her life, which include consistent employment in responsible positions, childbirth and child-rearing years, and graduation cum laude from law school while working.

There’s no justification for Baker to be involved with the discipline process, the ADB said.

[W]e find clear evidence that respondent drove while impaired by alcohol on one occasion. This criminal conduct was appropriately dealt with by the district court.

The other evidence marshaled fails to demonstrate the existence of a problem for the attorney discipline system to address.

Late last month, a four-justice majority denied the AGC’s application for leave to appeal. Justices Maura D. Corrigan and Robert P. Young Jr. would have granted leave.

Justice Elizabeth A. Weaver sat this one out, explaining:

I abstain from voting on any items dealing with the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) and/or the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC) to avoid any appearance that I could be trying to affect the outcome of the referrals of me to the JTC and AGC by Justices Corrigan, Young and Markman.

See, The Michigan Lawyer, “Weaver, Corrigan, Young and Markman: Supreme Court potboiler,” for more about this topic.

MSC remands fugitive entitlement case

The Michigan Supreme Court has remanded a 2006 divorce case to Houghton Circuit Court for clarification of its alimony award. But before the court can hear clarify the alimony issue in Friend v. Friend, defendant Julia Friend must first make good on the circuit court orders.

Alexander and Julia Friend were married in 1982, and had two sons.

In July 2006, Alexander filed for divorce. The two agreed to a court order that gave Julia physical custody of the boys. They both had legal custody. The court allowed Julia to move with the children to South Carolina.The children resisted visitation with their father, who claimed that Julia encouraged the children to resist.

The divorce was tried over four days in August 2007. The court ruled that the parents would work together to help the children build a relationship with their father. The court also ruled that certain assets, namely an inheritance Alexander had received, were his separate property, and split the remainder of the couple’s assets equally.

Julia was unwilling to facilitate the relationship between the children and their father, according to Michigan Supreme Court background on the case. She did not follow the court order to make the children available for counseling, nor did she make them available for visits with their father. She appealed the court ruling on parenting time, spousal support, property distribution, and attorney fees in the Court of Appeals.

Total spousal support was approximately $54,000 over five years, on a declining scale. The Friends are three years into the agreement, and Alexander pays $1,000 per month this year, and $500 per month for the next two years.

At the same time, Alexander filed motions in an attempt to get his former wife to comply with the visitation and counseling. She did not comply. The trial court found her in contempt and issued an arrest warrant. She appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. Her former husband argues that she cannot, under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.

Justice Maura D. Corrigan, in her dissent of the order, agreed:

Defendant has repeatedly violated the trial court’s orders concerning custody and parenting time, thus depriving the plaintiff father of any contact or relationship with his children for nearly three years. The trial court has found the defendant in contempt of court at least twice and issued a bench warrant for her arrest. The majority reaches the merits of defendant’s application while she continues to defy the trial court’s orders, including the very order from which she seeks relief. I would instead adpot the ‘fugitive disentitlement doctrine’ and condition our consideration of defendant’s application on her compliance with the trial court’s orders.

Justices Stephen J. Markman and Robert P. Young joined Corrigan’s dissent.

The majority stated, “As a precondition of the trial court clarifying the nature of its award, appellant shall purge herself of any outstanding findings of contempt in the circuit court within 90 days of the date of this order.”

Corrigan would have rather put the horse before the cart, so to speak:

I would not entertain her request for legal redress ‘while [s]he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state.’ MacPherson, supra. Instead, I would adopt the approach of the Arizona Supreme Court in Stewart v Stewart, 91 Ariz 356 (1962), and require defendant to comply with the trial court’s orders within a specified period of time or face dismissal of her application for leave to I appeal. I would give defendant 56 days to comply before dismissing her application.

Task force examines the “underground” economy

Michigan Supreme Court Justice Maura D. Corrigan, along with state, local and federal officials, will in a couple of hours unveil a report on Michigan’s so-called “underground economy.”

The problem, according to the report, is that a significant portion of the state economy is “underground” and unreported. It’s estimated in the report that the resulting tax gap is approximately $345 billion annually.

The impact on Michigan’s children and families is enormous, as underground earners underpay child support or evade it altogether. As a result, often child support under-payers and evaders avoid building relationships with their children, for fear that they’ll face economic consequences.

The 82-page report is the culmination of the efforts of the Underground Economy Task Force, and staff of the Michigan Supreme Court and the State Court Administrative Office. The task force’s goal is to bring underground earners “above ground, so that they can participate in their families and the community. The task force will discuss their findings at 10:30 this morning at the Michigan Hall of Justice in Lansing.

Task force members are:

Honorable Maura D. Corrigan, Justice, Michigan Supreme Court

Maurice Aouate, Special Agent In Charge, IRS Criminal Investigation Division

Michael C. Leibson, Assistant U.S. Attorney

Honorable Chad C. Schmucker, Judge, 4th Circuit Court, Jackson

Suzanne K. Hollyer, Director, Oakland County Friend of the Court Office

Mary Lannoye Controller/Administrator, Ingham County

James Long Chief, Corrections Division, Michigan Attorney General

Richard D. McLellan, McLellan Law Office

Patrick O’Brien, Chief, Child Support Division, Michigan Attorney General

Russell Prins Chief, Revenues & Collections Division, Michigan Attorney General

Douglas B. Roberts, MSU Institute for Public Policy and Social Research

Marilyn F. Stephen, Director, Michigan Office of Child Support

MSC: Anonymous tip was sufficient for school search, reverses Perreault

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision in People v Perreault, in which a Court of Appeals panel said a school administrator’s search of a student’s vehicle on school grounds violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

At issue in that case was whether the school took appropriate steps to verify the information contained in the anonymous tip on which it based its search.

The Supreme Court said it reversed the decision “for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion.” The court also rejected a defense argument that the role of the police “rendered this a police search.” The police passed the tip it obtained from an anonymous tip line to a school administrator, and the police’s liaison officer was present during the search, but did not conduct the search himself.

The dissenting judge, Peter D. O’Connell, wrote that the totality of circumstances provided the administrator with “sufficient indicia of reliability to support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”

Justice Stephen J. Markman, joined by Justices Maura D. Corrigan, Robert P. Young Jr. and Elizabeth A. Weaver, concurred with the order, writing:

Thus, there was corroborating information to indicate that the tipster’s information was reliable. In my judgment, the tip and the corroborating information were sufficient for school officials to form a particularized suspicion that defendant was, in fact, selling drugs from his truck in the school’s parking lot. Therefore, the search of defendant’s vehicle conducted by school officials on school property did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. Rather, it was an entirely reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly, joined by Justice Michael F. Cavanagh, dissented, saying the case was a close call and that she would grant the parties leave to appeal.

COA Judge Jane Markey: MSC wannabe?

Court of Appeals Judge Jane E. Markey

The stage may be set for Jane E. Markey, a Grand Rapids-based Michigan Court of Appeals judge, to seek one of the two Republican Party slots for the Michigan Supreme Court election in November.

Markey, according to The Grand Rapids Press, is interested in the nomination. Normally, MSC incumbents get their party’s nod but things are little different this time around for the GOP.

The GOP undoubtedly will nominate MSC Justice Robert P. Young Jr. to run for re-election. But Republican backing for Justice Elizabeth A. Weaver, who is also up for re-election, is far less certain.

She’s repeatedly broken ranks with Young and the other GOP-sponsored justices currently on the Court, Maura D. Corrigan and Stephen J. Markman.

In fact, Young doesn’t even want her on the ticket. He drew a line in the sand last January when he said, “They can nominate her, or they can nominate me,” referring to Republican convention delegates and Weaver, respectively.

The final straw may have been last week’s explosive public administrative hearing at the Michigan Supreme Court.

Corrigan, Young and Markman revealed that they asked the Judicial Tenure Commission to investigate Weaver for allegedly revealing internal deliberations about a case. The three say that Weaver violated Administrative Order No. 2006-8:

Deliberative Privilege and Case Discussions in the Supreme Court

The following administrative order, supplemental to the provisions of Administrative Order No. 1997-10, is effective immediately.

All correspondence, memoranda and discussions regarding cases or controversies are confidential. This obligation to honor confidentiality does not expire when a case is decided. The only exception to this obligation is that a Justice may disclose any unethical, improper or criminal conduct to the JTC or proper authority.

[Effective December 6, 2006]

Weaver says the order was never properly adopted and tried, without success, to get it rescinded at last week’s conference.

All of this bodes well for Markey and others who want a shot at a presumably open GOP top court slot.

MDP Chair Brewer slams MSC Justice Young

Michigan Democratic Party Chair Mark Brewer

Michigan Democratic Party Chair Mark Brewer is getting a jump start on the silly season of politics.

Brewer jabbed at Michigan Supreme Court Justice Robert P. Young Jr. in a press release issued yesterday. Young, who is running for re-election to the MSC this fall, doesn’t care about the average working Joe or Josephine, says Brewer.

Young, along with a majority of the justices, reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals in Alderman v. J.C. Development Communities, a construction-accident case in which Randy Alderman, a subcontractor’s employee, was badly burned when a crane hit a power line.

Michigan Supreme Court Justice Robert P. Young Jr.

At issue was whether the general contractor was liable to Alderman under the common-work-area doctrine. Under Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 471 Mich. 45 (2004), the doctrine requires proof of four elements:

• (1) that the defendant contractor failed to take reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority;
• (2) to guard against readily observable and avoidable dangers;
• (3) that created a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers; and
• (4) in a common work area.

Judge Edward Sosnick of the Oakland County Circuit Court said Alderman hadn’t made his case, reasoning that Alderman and the other five members of his crew were the only ones in the area. According to Sosnick:

At most, six employees of one subcontractor were exposed to the risk of electrocution. This is not sufficient to establish a common work area.

The COA panel, Judges Donald S. Owens, Deborah A. Servitto and Elizabeth L. Gleicher, disagreed.

Plaintiff presented evidence that this construction project was rather large and that his employer was not the only subcontractor working in the vicinity of the power lines on the date of this accident. …

Plaintiff’s crew may have been the only subcontractors working on lot 273 when the accident occurred, but the power lines did not merely run along the one lot. They ran along several lots under active construction, and electricity is commonly understood to be hazardous.

The crane could easily have torn down the power lines, creating a hazard to anyone within striking distance of the fallen lines, or could have caused a fire. The risk of harm associated with a crane hitting the power lines is high and is not as narrow as defendant would suggest.

The risk at issue is the potential harm to be had if the crane hit the power lines — not merely the harm to be had if the crane made contact with the power lines and someone was involved in the electrical circuit between the power lines the crane.

In an order issued last week, Young and four other justices reversed, using language that generally tracked Sosnick’s when he initially dismissed the case:

The risk of injury at issue here was the risk of electrocution from a subcontractor’s crane coming into contact with power lines above the construction site.

The only employees exposed to the risk of electrocution were two to six employees of one subcontractor, including the plaintiff, and therefore there was not a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers.

Brewer, on the Democratic Party’s website, was quick to pounce, painting Young as a friend of insurance and business interests and a working-class enemy:

On Law Day, which is intended to celebrate the benefits to all Americans of the American legal system, Michigan Supreme Court Justice Bob Young again denies those benefits to injured workers.

In an order released Friday, April 30th, Young and his colleagues denied relief to a construction worker, severely burned and nearly electrocuted on the job, because there was “not a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers.” …

“If six employees at risk of electrocution is ‘not a high degree of risk to a significant number of employees’ according to Young, how many workers doing what dangerous job is enough?” asked Michigan Democratic Party Chair Mark Brewer. …

“To Young, only insurance companies, corporations and their CEO’s, the people who fund his campaigns, are entitled to legal protection.”

But Brewer’s rhetoric proves a little too much.

Could you imagine Brewer leveling the same broadside against MSC Justice Michael F. Cavanagh, who has had the warm support of the Democratic Party in elections past? Not in this lifetime.

But Cavanagh joined Young, and Justices Elizabeth A. Weaver, Maura D. Corrigan and Stephen J. Markman in reversing the COA and reinstating Sosnick’s dismissal. Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly and Justice Diane M. Hathaway would have denied leave to appeal the COA’s decision.

That might make one think that Alderman is not about one justice looking for an opportunity to kick someone when they are down and, instead, is better understood as a principled disagreement about the scope of a legal doctrine that forecloses one avenue of relief.

The silly season of politics is upon us.